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III. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT AND SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION
Abrams v. Societe Nationale des Chemis de Fer Francais
In Abrams v. Societe Nationale des Chemis de Fer Francais, 332
F .3d 173 (2002), plaintiff brought suit this individually and on behalf of
other Holocaust victims and such heirs against the French International
Railroad, Societe Nationale des Chemis de Fer Francais [hereinafter
SNCF] for actions arising out of the operation of trains which
transferred thousands of French civilians to Nazi concentration camps. 33
The allegation stated that SNCF violated customary international law by
committing crimes against humanity and acts of war crimes. 34
While the Nazi's occupied France, the SNCF remained under
civilian control and maintained its independence by cooperating with
German authorities and satisfying their transportation requests. 35 In
March of 1942, at the insistence of the German authorities, SNCF began
transporting Jews and other "undesirables" from France to the
concentration camps. 36
Defendant argued that the district court lacked subject matter
claiming that SNCF was an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state" as defined in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 197 6
[hereinafter FSIA]. 37 Plaintiffs argued that the FSIA should not be
applied to their claims claiming that it would be "impermissibly
retroactive" and issues immunity and subject matter jurisdiction should
be resolved using those laws in effect in the 1940's. 38 Furthermore,
plaintiff argued that the "SNCF was not entitled to sovereign immunity
because it was organized as a corporate entity and distinct from the
French government." 39 Additionally, plaintiff argued federal subject
matter jurisdiction under the federal question statute and the Alien Tort
Claims Statute. 40
In granting defendant's motion for summary
judgment, the district court reasoned that plaintiffs' claims did not fall
under one of the FSIA' s enumerated exceptions and therefore they

33. Abrams v. Societe Nationale des Chemis de Fer Francais, 332 F.3d 173, 174
(2002).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 175.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 174.
38. Abrams, 332 F.3d at 175.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 179.
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lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter. 41
Prior the enactment of FSIA, issues of sovereign immunity in
American courts was decided by the executive branch and they operated
under the theory that a foreign sovereign cannot be sued in American
courts without first obtaining consent from the sovereign. 42 Under such
a theory, "a foreign state is immune from claims arising our of the
state's governmental activities, but not immune from claims arising out
of its commercial activities. 43 However, under the FSIA of 1976,
foreign states are immune from the jurisdiction of the federal district
courts unless the FSIA provides otherwise. 44 The FSIA applies to
claims brought against an instrumentality of foreign state, as defined as
"first, it must be a 'separate legal person, corporate or otherwise;'
second, it must be 'an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof;' ... third, it must be 'neither a citizen of a State of the United
States... nor created under the laws of any third country. "'45 Here, the
court found that SNCF was an instrumentality of France as of this point
in time, but the evidence does not indicate whether it was such during
the 1940's.46 However, this issue was resolved in a later case, Dole
Food Co. v. Patrickson, 123 S.Ct. 1655 (2003), holding that such a
matter must be determined at the time the complaint is filed. 47
This court relied on the two-step test stated in Landgraf, to
determine whether the FSIA should apply retroactively to events
occurring prior to its enactment. 48 First, a court inquires, "whether
Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's proper reach. " 49 If the
answer to such question is yes, then the examination ceases. 50 If the
answer to such question is no, "the court must determine whether
applyinfi the statute to pre-enactment events "would have retroactive
effect." 1 If the court determines that there is such an effect, the court
must reject the application of the statute. 52 Here, the court analyzed this
situation using the Landgraf test and determined that the FSIA shall not

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
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Id. at 179-80.
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Patrickson, 123 S.Ct. 1655 (2003).
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apply.53
Therefore, this court reverses the decision to dismiss the plaintiffs
complaint and remands the case for further proceedings consistent with
the opinion of this court. 54

Rebecca E. Hill

IV. THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT AND SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy
A. Introduction
In Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, the District
Court for the Southern District of New York held that there was subject
matter jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Claims Act [hereinafter
ATCA], and that the Court could assert personal jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation under New York law. 55 The Court treated Talisman
Energy [hereinafter Talisman], a Canadian corporation, as a state actor
for ATCA purposes and further found that Talisman's acts constituted
}us cogens violations. 56
This Court's ruling reaffirmed Second Circuit and international
treaty precedent, which holds that corporations may be held liable for
}us cogens violations under the ATCA. 57 However, the District Court's
ruling expanded the Court's subject matter jurisdiction under the
ATCA. First, the Court reaffirmed that a corporation engaging in
genocide need not act under color of state law in order to be subject to
}us cogens violations under the ATCA. 58
Secondly, the Court
determined that even if a corporation were not acting directly under
color of state law, demonstration of a "substantial degree of
cooperation" between a corporation and a state is sufficient to treat the
corporation as a state actor under the ATCA. 59

53. Abrams, 332 F.3d at 186.
54. Id. at 188.
55. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 319,331
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) [hereinafter Presbyterian Church].
56. Id. at 328-29; See id. at 306.
57. See id. at 308-14, 316--17.
58. Presbyterian Church, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 328.
59. Id. at 328-29.
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